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globicus

Recession May Be Delayed But Not Avoided

Leave a Comment / Leading Economic Indexes / globicus

Recession May Be Delayed But Not Avoided Read More »

Progress on Inflation May Slow

Leave a Comment / Leading Inflation Indexes, Uncategorized / globicus

Progress on Inflation May Slow Read More »

Lower Inflation Ahead

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Lower Inflation Ahead Read More »

Is It Different This Time?

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Is It Different This Time? Read More »

Lower Inflation Ahead

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Lower Inflation Ahead Read More »

We Are Headed for A Recession

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We Are Headed for A Recession Read More »

5-Year Breakeven Inflation Rate

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5-Year Breakeven Inflation Rate Read More »

Recession by Christmas

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Recession by Christmas Read More »

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Recent Posts

  • What Should Be Done?
    by globicus
    February 24, 2026

    Policy Prioritization and the Federal Reserve’s Dual Mandate

    Executive Summary:

    • Primary Objective: Price stability should be the Federal Reserve’s nonnegotiable priority; sustained maximum employment depends on it.
    • Instrument Constraint: With only monetary policy available, the Fed faces trade-offs in pursuing two targets simultaneously.
    • Tinbergen Rule: Achieving multiple objectives requires at least as many independent instruments as targets; monetary policy best serves inflation control, fiscal policy addresses employment.
    • Mundell Assignment Principle: Monetary policy optimally targets inflation; fiscal measures can stabilize employment and output without igniting inflation.
    • Time-Consistency & Phillips Curve: Attempts to reduce unemployment below its natural rate via monetary expansion are self-defeating, leading to higher inflation but no lasting employment gains.
    • Policy Implication: In recessions, rate cuts may support both inflation and employment, but outside downturns, the Fed must prioritize inflation anchoring while supporting employment only when inflation expectations are stable.
    • Strategic Takeaway: A rules-based commitment to price stability ensures credible, long-term conditions for sustainable employment growth.

    1. The Federal Reserve’s Dual Mandate and Policy Prioritization

    The Federal Reserve’s dual mandate, as established by Congress, is to promote price stability and maximum employment, with an additional, subsidiary objective of fostering moderate long-term interest rates. These targets affect distinct facets of the U.S. economy—namely, price levels, labor markets, and capital markets. Among these, moderate long-term interest rates are widely regarded as an endogenous outcome contingent upon the successful attainment of price stability and maximum employment, not as an independent policy target.

    In a well-functioning market economy, moderate long-term interest rates are expected to materialize naturally once the foundational goals of price stability and full employment have been met. Furthermore, the maintenance of maximum employment itself hinges upon success in achieving price stability, as inflation control establishes vital conditions for sustainable employment growth. Therefore, it is logical to assert that the Federal Reserve should prioritize price stability, recognizing that its primary policy tool—monetary policy—is markedly more effective in regulating inflation than directly influencing labor market outcomes.

    2. Tinbergen’s Rule and the Instrument–Target Framework

    Jan Tinbergen, the inaugural Nobel laureate in economics, formulated an essential principle for economic policy: to achieve multiple objectives, policymakers must possess at least as many independent instruments as there are targets. Thus, realizing both price stability and maximum employment in principle requires two independent policy tools. If policymakers could employ both monetary and fiscal levers, each could be directed toward the policy target for which it has the greatest efficacy. Monetary policy would address price stability, while fiscal policy would aim to smooth fluctuations in employment or output.

    In practice, however, the Federal Reserve relies almost exclusively on monetary policy, thereby confronting the challenge of pursuing two distinct goals with a single instrument. This structural asymmetry introduces the risk of suboptimal trade-offs. Given the comparative effectiveness of monetary policy in managing nominal variables—particularly inflation—it is justifiable for the central bank to assign price stability as its dominant priority, treating full employment as a conditional, secondary objective.

    3. Mundell’s Assignment Principle and Policy Coordination

    Robert Mundell extended Tinbergen’s insight by articulating the Assignment Principle, which posits that each policy tool should be allocated to the target it is best suited to influence. In Mundell’s view, monetary policy is optimally targeted at inflation, while fiscal policy more effectively addresses employment or output stabilization. Although the Federal Reserve’s mandate encompasses both inflation and employment, operating with a solitary monetary policy instrument constrains its ability to simultaneously achieve both objectives.

    In his analysis of the stagflation crises of the 1970s, Mundell critiqued the prevailing Keynesian policy mix—monetary expansion to combat unemployment paired with fiscal restraint to curb inflation. He advocated for a reversal: a tight monetary stance to control inflation, and expansionary fiscal stimuli, such as tax reductions, to support employment and output. Mundell’s policy assignment approach correctly recognized that inflation is fundamentally a monetary phenomenon, while fiscal incentives can improve labor supply and productivity without igniting inflation. His insights anticipated the subsequent policy mix methodologies of the 1980s, which underpinned both monetarist and supply-side economic reforms.

    4. The Time-Consistency Problem and Commitment to Price Stability

    The primacy of price stability is further underlined by the time-consistency problem in discretionary monetary policy. When the Federal Reserve attempts to drive unemployment below its natural rate by adopting an expansionary stance, any short-run benefits are quickly undermined as inflation expectations adjust. The public, foreseeing higher inflation, incorporates these expectations into wage and price setting, causing unemployment to revert to its natural rate while leaving inflation permanently elevated. This dynamic demonstrates that a credible commitment to price stability is essential for effective policy, since attempts to ‘trick’ the economy with surprise inflation are ultimately self-defeating.

    To resolve this, it is imperative that the Federal Reserve make price stability its unequivocal, nonnegotiable objective. Within such a rules-based framework, the central bank may then pursue employment stabilization, but only insofar as inflation expectations remain firmly anchored.

    5. The Limits of Monetary Policy and the Phillips Curve

    Monetary policy operates predominantly on nominal variables, such as inflation and interest rates, but exerts little sustained influence over real variables like employment or real output. This is formalized in the long-run Phillips curve, which is vertical—indicating that in the long term, unemployment converges to its natural rate, or Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), regardless of the rate of inflation. Attempts to decrease unemployment sustainably below this level only result in successively higher inflation, not persistent reductions in joblessness. Hence, while short-run trade-offs between inflation and unemployment may exist, long-term improvements in the labor market depend on structural and fiscal policies, not monetary stimulus alone.

    6. Policy Implications and Contemporary Evidence

    Recent Federal Reserve communications illustrate these theoretical dynamics. In a speech at the National Association for Business Economics (NABE) Philadelphia Conference on October 14, 2025, Chair Jerome Powell underscored the challenge of balancing two risks: lowering interest rates too soon could leave inflationary pressures unresolved, while moving too slowly could punish the labor market with rising unemployment. This real-world dilemma encapsulates the structural limitations of seeking to achieve two objectives with one policy tool.

    During recessions, the central bank’s objectives are temporarily aligned—rate reductions can both tame inflation and stimulate employment as inflation pressures typically recede in downturns. Yet absent a recession, the imperative remains to prioritize inflation control, anchoring market expectations and ensuring the conditions necessary for robust, sustainable employment in the long term.

    It is unlikely that the Federal Reserve will prioritize its price stability mandate. Rather, the institution is expected to implement an additional 25-basis-point rate cut at its October 28–29 meeting, likely justifying the decision by citing continued weakness in labor market conditions.

    Hans Nilsson

    Quebec City, Canada


    Notes

    • 1. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “The Federal Reserve’s Dual Mandate,” FederalReserve.gov, https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm
    • 2. Jan Tinbergen, “On the Theory of Economic Policy,” in Essays in Economic Policy (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1963), 1–58.
    • 3. Robert A. Mundell, “The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability,” IMF Staff Papers 9, no. 1 (1962): 70–79.
    • 4. Robert A. Mundell, International Economics (New York: Macmillan, 1968).
    • 5. Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, “Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy 85, no. 3 (1977): 473–491.
    • 6. Milton Friedman, “The Role of Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review 58, no. 1 (1968): 1–17.
    • 7. Edmund S. Phelps, “Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment Over Time,” Economica 34, no. 135 (1967): 254–281.
    • 8. Jerome H. Powell, Remarks at the NABE Conference, Philadelphia, October 14, 2025.

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  • Globicus Leading Economic Index
    by globicus
    February 15, 2026

    US ECONOMIC EXPANSION CONTINUES

    Executive Summary

    The Globicus Leading Economic Index signals sustained U.S. economic expansion into early 2026. Forward-looking indicators remain firmly positive, the yield curve has normalized, fiscal stimulus is forthcoming, and monetary policy remains accommodative relative to standard policy benchmarks.

     

    Globicus Leading Economic Indexes: Recent Developments and Business Cycle Assessment

    The Globicus suite of leading economic indexes—comprising the Total Leading Index, Long Leading Index, and Short Leading Index, is constructed to identify cyclical turning points and enhance the precision of forward-looking macroeconomic forecasts. These composite indicators serve as anticipatory measures of business cycle transitions and aggregate economic trajectory.

    The most recent data releases and subsequent revisions indicate strengthening momentum across all leading indicators.[1] The Total Leading Index registered growth of 1.4 in December 2025, representing an acceleration from 1.3 in November. The Short Leading Index, which has maintained positive territory continuously since mid-2023, was 1.5 in December down from 1.9 in November. Concurrently, the Long Leading Index advanced strongly to 1.2 in December from 0.5 in November, marking its fourth consecutive positive reading.

    Collectively, these composite measures show positive momentum, signaling continued economic expansion for the United States economy through at least the first part of 2026.

    The Globicus Coincident Index (GCI), which synthesizes contemporaneous macroeconomic data, rose to 0.8 in December 2025, an increase from the multi-year nadir of 0.4 observed in October. This uptick suggests a potential inflection point in the current growth trajectory, indicating a reversal from recent deceleration.

     

     

    The Yield Curve Has Turned Positive

    The yield spread between the ten-year and three-month Treasury securities, a historically robust recession predictor, turned positive on December 13, 2024, thus ending the longest recorded inversion. Historically, an inverted yield curve has preceded recessions, and in recent cycles, the curve typically turned positive shortly before the onset of recession, as the Federal Reserve began to lower the federal funds rate. The spread hovered near zero for a while but has risen to over fifty basis points in early 2026, because of easier monetary conditions, AI optimism: strong capex investment and productivity gains. Fiscal stimulus may also support the expansion in 2026. Tax incentives; tax refunds, lower tax on overtime and tips, and accelerated depreciation. In addition, regulatory reforms will support growth, The CBO estimates that the One Big Beautiful Bill, (OBBBA) will boost US growth by 0.9%.

     

     

    Federal Reserve Monetary Policy Decision

     

    At its January 27–28, 2026, meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) maintained the federal funds rate target range at 3.50%–3.75%, noting that economic activity “has been expanding at a solid pace.” Governors Stephen Miran and Christopher Waller dissented, favoring a 25-basis-point reduction. The pause ended a sequence of three consecutive 25-bp cuts, which had been framed by the Fed as insurance measures amid a weakening employment situation.

    At the press conference, Chairman Jerome Powell emphasized that the balance of risks between employment and inflation now justifies a pause in rate cuts. He noted that, after the recent 75-bp reduction, the federal funds rate is “around neutral” or at the “higher range of the neutral range.” Powell also reiterated that the Fed does not mechanically target the natural rate (r*) but instead evaluates a broad set of indicators to assess whether policy is restrictive, neutral, or accommodative.

    Since 2012, the Fed has increasingly emphasized its employment mandate. The 2012 “Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy” established a 2% inflation target. Revisions in August 2020 introduced Flexible Average Inflation Targeting (FAIT), allowing inflation moderately above 2% following periods of persistent undershooting, and shifted language from “deviations of employment” to “shortfalls of employment,” creating an asymmetric approach tolerant of low unemployment.

    While these frameworks aimed to support economic growth, they also risked overstimulation, potentially reducing long-term growth and creating regressive distributional effects. Elevated inflation increases uncertainty for production and investment decisions, disproportionately affecting those with limited hedging options.

    The August 2025 revision of the Fed’s strategy marked a return to a more balanced approach, removing explicit references to a persistently low neutral rate and the effective lower bound, and abandoning the emphasis on running the economy “hot” to achieve maximum employment. The Committee reaffirmed that maintaining price stability—anchored at 2% PCE inflation—is central to achieving both maximum employment and long-run economic stability.

    Labor Market Dynamics and Structural Shifts

     

     

    The labor market has experienced substantial deceleration over the past year, providing the primary rationale for recent monetary policy easing. Both demand-side and supply-side factors have contributed to the slowdown in employment growth. In 2025, nonfarm employment increased by 584,000, a significant slowdown from over 2 million jobs added in 2024. Federal employment declined by 274,000, largely due to initiatives from the Department of Government Efficiency, while manufacturing and retail trade also recorded net job losses.

    Immigration policy enforcement has further contracted the labor force. Between March 2025 and December 2025, foreign-born employment declined by 1.113 million workers, who subsequently exited the labor market entirely. Concurrently, federal workforce reductions eliminated approximately 220,000 positions. Together, these factors substantially reduced the available labor pool, disproportionately affecting industries and occupations traditionally reliant on less-educated and immigrant workers.

    Recent research highlights additional technology-driven disruptions. A Stanford University working paper documents that artificial intelligence adoption has produced asymmetric employment effects across demographic cohorts. Workers aged 22–25 in occupations with the highest AI exposure have experienced a 13% employment decline since 2022, indicating significant displacement concentrated among entry-level workers.

    Irrespective of normative assessments of these structural developments, conventional monetary policy accommodation through interest rate cuts is unlikely to materially alter supply-side or technology-driven labor market outcomes. As argued in “What Should Be Done?” [10], prioritizing inflation control first is more effective: maintaining stable, low inflation will create conditions for an optimal labor market and sustainable maximum employment.

     

    Lower Break-Even-Employment

     

    Recent empirical research by Cheremukhin (2025) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas [4] shows that U.S. break-even employment requirements have contracted significantly due to shifts in immigration patterns. Using high-frequency estimation techniques, Cheremukhin demonstrates that changes in immigration flows, combined with cyclical variations in labor force participation, have sharply reduced the monthly job creation threshold needed to maintain a stable unemployment rate. Specifically, the monthly break-even employment requirement fell from roughly 250,000 positions in 2023 to an estimated 30,000 by mid-2025.

    The underlying theory of break-even employment holds that stabilizing the unemployment rate requires employment growth to match labor force growth. Translating this into absolute terms provides a measure of the net jobs required each month. Cheremukhin constructs high-frequency time series for three key components of U.S. population dynamics—natural population change, legal immigration flows, and net unauthorized immigration—and combines them to generate a comprehensive estimate of break-even employment dynamics.

    These calculations show that the monthly job creation threshold required to maintain labor market equilibrium rose from under 100,000 positions in late 2020 to roughly 250,000 by mid-2023, before declining sharply to approximately 30,000 by mid-2025. This dramatic contraction in break-even employment has important implications for assessing labor market conditions and interpreting employment data in the current macroeconomic environment.

    Assessment of Monetary Policy Stance

     

    A common gauge for assessing the stance of monetary policy is the spread between the annualized growth rate of nominal GDP and the federal funds rate. This differential indicates whether policy is accommodative or restrictive. During the current business cycle, this spread has remained largely positive, with only a brief negative interval, in contrast to previous recessions, where persistently negative spreads typically preceded or coincided with economic contractions.

    In the third quarter of 2025, nominal GDP growth reached 8.2% on an annualized basis, while the effective federal funds rate averaged 4.2%, resulting in a positive spread of 400 basis points. This sizable differential suggests that monetary conditions at the end of the third quarter were clearly accommodative. The persistence of a positive spread further supports the view that monetary policy was not excessively tight during this period.

    Additional macroeconomic and financial indicators support this assessment. If monetary policy were excessively restrictive, we would expect to see slower nominal spending growth, weaker income expansion, declining corporate profitability, wider credit spreads, and falling inflation expectations. None of these signs are present: nominal income growth remains robust, corporate profit margins are stable, credit spreads are within normal ranges, and inflation expectations—both survey- and market-based—remain anchored near the Fed’s target.

    Financial conditions indices provide further insight. The Chicago Fed’s Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index (ANFCI), which synthesizes conditions across money, debt, equity, and broader financial markets, has consistently registered negative values throughout the Fed’s disinflation campaign, signaling accommodative financial conditions. Since 2023, the index has trended even more negative, reflecting progressively easier financial conditions despite elevated policy rates. This pattern reinforces the conclusion that the current tightening cycle has not created restrictive financial conditions.

    Labor Market Conditions and the Sahm Rule

     

    The United States unemployment rate declined to 4.4% in December 2025 from 4.5% in November, maintaining levels insufficient to activate the Sahm Rule recession indicator.[1] This empirical rule, developed by Claudia Sahm, identifies recessionary conditions when the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate increases by at least 0.50 percentage points relative to its minimum three-month average over the preceding 12-month period. As of December 2025, the Sahm indicator registered 0.33%, remaining below the recessionary threshold of 0.50%.

    Historical evidence shows that unemployment rates exhibit persistent upward trajectories during recessionary episodes. While the Sahm Rule has demonstrated efficacy in identifying recession onset, it functions as a coincident rather than leading indicator, confirming rather than anticipating cyclical downturns. Furthermore, the suite of indicators monitored by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee corroborates that the United States economy is not currently in recession.

     

    Monetary Policy Assessment: The Taylor Rule Framework

     

    The Taylor Rule, developed by economist John B. Taylor, provides a normative framework linking the Federal Reserve’s policy interest rate to key macroeconomic fundamentals—namely, inflation and the output gap—serving as a benchmark for assessing monetary policy stance.[1] The rule incorporates the output gap, estimated using Congressional Budget Office (CBO) measures of potential output, and contemporaneous inflation, measured via the GDP Implicit Price Deflator. The conventional specification assumes a 2% inflation target and a 2% equilibrium real interest rate (r*), though these parameters can be adjusted based on evolving economic conditions and central bank objectives.

     

    In our estimated model, we set the equilibrium real rate at 1.0%, consistent with recent Laubach-Williams estimates, and the Fed’s 2% inflation target. Under this configuration, the Taylor Rule prescribes a federal funds rate of 5.45%, compared to the observed rate of 4.33% in the third quarter of 2025. Following subsequent Fed rate cuts, the policy rate stood at 3.62% in January 2026. In this model, changes in r* translate approximately one-for-one into adjustments of the Taylor rate.

     

    The analysis indicates a substantial gap between the model’s recommended rate and the observed policy rate. With the current policy rate, after 75 basis points of recent cuts, positioned well below the Taylor Rule recommendation, there is limited justification for further immediate monetary accommodation. The Fed’s pause at the January 27–28 meeting, maintaining the target range at 3.50–3.75%, may reflect a continuation of gradual policy normalization, albeit at a slower pace.

     

    Under the Taylor Rule framework, the prescribed policy response is to raise interest rates when inflation accelerates and to reduce rates when economic growth slows. When both conditions occur simultaneously—as often happens during adverse supply shocks—the optimal prescription may be to maintain the policy rate at its current level. However, if labor market conditions weaken and unemployment begins to rise, political and market pressures can increase the likelihood of monetary accommodation, potentially influencing the Fed’s decisions beyond the rule’s mechanical guidance. Fed Chairman Jerome Powell has suggested that the Fed should focus on the relative deviations from its dual objectives of price stability and maximum employment.

    Between 2015 and 2025, U.S. monetary policy experienced one of its most dynamic cycles in decades. The Fed gradually raised the federal funds rate to 2.25%–2.50% by 2018, before reversing course in 2019 with three “insurance” cuts to 1.50%–1.75%. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, rates were sharply reduced to 0%–0.25% and maintained through early 2022 despite falling unemployment and rising inflation. From March 2022 to July 2023, the Fed executed its fastest tightening campaign in recent history, raising rates to 5.25%–5.50%. The policy stance shifted again in late 2024, with successive rate cuts bringing the target range to 3.50%–3.75% by the end of 2025. Viewed through the lens of the Taylor Rule, this decade reflects a persistently accommodative posture, with policy rates generally remaining below the levels implied by the rule since the Great Recession.

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    The US Economy is Expanding

    The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee establishes the authoritative chronology of U.S. business cycles. The Committee defines a recession as “a significant decline in economic activity that is spread across the economy and lasts more than a few months.”[2] In formulating its determinations, the Committee conducts a comprehensive evaluation of monthly economic indicators, including real personal income less transfer payments, nonfarm payroll and household employment, real personal consumption expenditures, inflation-adjusted wholesale and retail trade sales, and industrial production.

     

    Recent readings across these series continue to demonstrate economic resilience, although the majority of indicators have exhibited stabilization rather than growth. Personal consumption expenditures (PCE) have maintained robust performance, while industrial production (IP) has shown recent growth momentum. The remaining indicators have stabilized without contraction, and critically, none display broad-based decline. Consequently, the observed deceleration is limited in scope and does not satisfy the Committee’s criteria for declaring recessionary conditions.

    The Committee also considers quarterly national income and product account aggregates, most notably Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross Domestic Income (GDI). In the third quarter of 2025, real GDP expanded at a 4.4 percent seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR), with year-over-year growth of 2.3 percent. Real GDI advanced at a 2.4 percent SAAR in the second quarter of 2025, a modest deceleration from 2.6 percent in the preceding quarter, while year-over-year growth reached 2.4 percent. Although official fourth-quarter estimates remain forthcoming, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s GDPNow nowcasting model currently projects fourth-quarter real GDP growth at 4.2 percent SAAR, suggesting further acceleration. This projection, however, may incorporate upward bias due to exceptionally strong net export performance in the early portion of the quarter.

    Taken together, the available empirical evidence indicates no substantial or broad-based economic deterioration. Aggregate data continue to reflect ongoing expansion and provide no analytical foundation for the Committee to designate the onset of a recessionary episode. To justify such a determination, economic weakness would need to be both pervasive across key

  • NAVIGATING BY R-STAR: STRUCTURAL MONETARY POLICY AND RECESSION RISK
    by globicus
    February 14, 2026

    Summary:

    Navigating by R-Star presents a structural framework for evaluating U.S. monetary policy through the lens of the natural rate of interest (r*). By comparing the real federal funds rate to r*, the analysis identifies when policy is accommodative, restrictive, or neutral and traces how these regimes evolve across the business cycle. The report combines r* estimates, interest rates, inflation, and financial indicators to assess policy transmission and cyclical positioning, supported by visual analysis of rate-hiking and easing phases. A complementary structural recession risk model captures macro-financial stress arising from tightening cycles, highlighting periods of elevated vulnerability while emphasizing that it measures fragility—not deterministic recession forecasts. Together, the framework offers a disciplined way to interpret policy stance, late-cycle risks, and the broader macroeconomic outlook. 

    A Structural Framework for Assessing Monetary Policy Regimes and Cyclical Risk

    The concept of r-star (r*) originates from Knut Wicksell’s notion of the neutral rate of interest and was later formalized in modern macroeconomic frameworks, most notably by Holston, Laubach, and Williams. Empirical estimates of r* have become central to contemporary monetary policy analysis and central bank decision-making. The r* rate represents the theoretical real short-term interest rate consistent with an economy operating at full employment and stable inflation—conditions under which monetary policy is neither expansionary nor contractionary.

    The deviation between the observed real policy rate and r* provides a practical framework for assessing the stance of monetary policy and its macroeconomic implications. A policy rate below r* indicates accommodative conditions that support aggregate demand, while a rate above r* signals a restrictive stance that dampens economic activity. This policy gap serves as a key indicator of cyclical positioning, helping policymakers and market participants evaluate whether prevailing monetary conditions align with the economy’s long-run equilibrium.

    Structural Policy and Interest Rate

    Using r*, we construct a structural macroeconomic framework that integrates key U.S. economic and financial indicators, including the federal funds rate, long-term Treasury yields, inflation, and multiple r* estimates. The model aggregates data quarterly and derives measures of real interest rates and policy gaps to assess monetary policy relative to equilibrium conditions. These indicators classify policy regimes, highlight potential misalignments, and evaluate transmission through financial conditions. Systematic visualization techniques—including shading of hiking and easing cycles alongside NBER recession periods—enable a unified assessment of monetary policy dynamics across the business cycle.

     

    The Monetary Policy under R* plot illustrates periods of restrictive versus accommodative policy, interest rate cycles, and deviations from the neutral policy rate (r*). Only during the 1980s was the real federal funds rate consistently above r*. Since 2000, monetary policy—measured by the real federal funds rate—has remained below r* with only a few brief exceptions. The Fed began its long-overdue hiking cycle in March 2022, when CPI inflation was 6.5%, and the federal funds rate peaked at 5.33% in August 2023. Rate easing commenced in September 2024. In the chart, pink denotes real rate hiking periods, light blue indicates real rate easing periods, and white represents neutral phases.

     

    From the chart, it is clear that the early-2022 hiking cycle has now transitioned into an easing cycle. By the end of the third quarter of 2025, the real federal funds rate was approximately equal to the estimated natural rate (r*), implying a policy stance consistent with stable inflation and output near potential. Earlier monetary policy had been restrictive, with the real federal funds rate exceeding r* for roughly two years. By the end of Q3 2025, the stance had shifted toward neutrality, indicating little or no monetary restraint. Since then, the Federal Reserve has reduced the policy rate twice by 25 basis points; while fourth-quarter estimates are not yet available, absent evidence of a decline in r*, these cuts suggest that the current policy stance may have moved into accommodative territory.

     

     

     

    Structural Recession Probability Model

    The Structural Recession Probability Model is constructed as a composite macro-financial stress index grounded in monetary policy transmission theory. It synthesizes several structurally motivated indicators—including yield-curve term spreads, the real policy rate relative to r*, the absolute level of ex-ante real interest rates, and the cumulative pace of monetary tightening—into a normalized, historically scaled recession-risk measure. Each component captures a distinct channel through which restrictive monetary policy propagates through financial conditions and real economic activity, representing systemic policy-induced vulnerabilities rather than relying solely on reduced-form statistical correlations.

    Methodologically, the model functions as a structural risk-monitoring system rather than a probabilistic forecasting model derived from econometric classification techniques. The composite index is standardized over historical distributions to enable cross-cycle comparability and to identify periods characterized by elevated macro-financial stress. Visualization alongside NBER recession periods provides an ex-post validation framework, showing that the index typically rises during late-cycle phases when monetary conditions become increasingly restrictive.

    Empirically, the model captures most historical recession episodes, though it occasionally signals elevated risk during expansions that ultimately avoided contraction. These periods likely reflect the model’s sensitivity to emerging structural imbalances and tightening financial conditions rather than false positives. Accordingly, the index should be interpreted as a measure of cyclical fragility and transmission stress, not a deterministic recession forecast. Episodes in which elevated risk did not culminate in recession may also be viewed as instances where timely fiscal or monetary policy intervention helped stabilize the cycle.

    Recent readings indicate a pronounced increase in structural vulnerability during the rapid tightening cycle of 2022–2023, consistent with historically elevated hard-landing risk. The subsequent decline in the index suggests a partial easing of monetary policy transmission stress following the moderation in policy rates. Although the Federal Reserve may be approaching a soft-landing outcome, inflation has remained above its 2 percent target for approximately five consecutive years, underscoring the persistence of underlying price pressures. Given ongoing uncertainty surrounding the evolution of r*, financial conditions, and real-sector resilience, current readings should be interpreted as signaling reduced—but not eliminated—late-cycle fragility.

    References

    [1] Holston, Laubach, and Williams. 2017. “Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest: International Trends and Determinants,” Journal of International Economics 108, Supplemental 1 (May): S39–S75.

  • Early Signs of Economic Weakness
    by globicus
    June 2, 2025

    Globicus’ Leading Economic Indexes are designed to anticipate turning points in the business cycle, and the latest readings indicate signs of economic deceleration. After showing solid momentum at the end of 2024, the indexes have weakened in the spring of 2025. The Long Leading Index declined from -2.3 in March to -4.1 in April. The Short Leading Index, which had remained positive since mid-2023, fell from 2.4 in March to 1.0 in April. The Total Index, which had hovered around zero over the past year, dropped from 0.3 to -1.2 in April. Collectively, these indicators suggest that while the risk of a recession has risen, a near-term recession remains unlikely.

     

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  • US Economy Slowing but Recession Not Imminent
    by globicus
    June 2, 2025

    Globicus’ Leading Economic Indexes are designed to predict economic turning points, and the latest data indicate a somewhat mixed picture. The Long Leading Index turned more negative. The Short Leading Index remained positive and rose to the most positive level since May 2024, and the Total Index rose for the third month in four, reinforcing the low likelihood of a near-term recession.

     

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  • What Should Be Done?
    Primary Objective: Price stability should be the Federal Reserve’s nonnegotiable priority; sustained maximum employment depends on it.
  • Globicus Leading Economic Index
    US ECONOMIC EXPANSION CONTINUES Executive Summary The Globicus Leading Economic Index signals sustained U.S. economic expansion into early 2026. Forward-looking indicators remain firmly positive, the yield curve has normalized, fiscal stimulus is forthcoming, and monetary policy remains accommodative relative to standard policy benchmarks.   Globicus Leading Economic Indexes: Recent Developments and Business Cycle Assessment The
  • NAVIGATING BY R-STAR: STRUCTURAL MONETARY POLICY AND RECESSION RISK
    Summary: Navigating by R-Star presents a structural framework for evaluating U.S. monetary policy through the lens of the natural rate of interest (r*). By comparing the real federal funds rate to r*, the analysis identifies when policy is accommodative, restrictive, or neutral and traces how these regimes evolve across the business cycle. The report combines
  • Early Signs of Economic Weakness
    Globicus’ Leading Economic Indexes are designed to anticipate turning points in the business cycle, and the latest readings indicate signs of economic deceleration. After showing solid momentum at the end of 2024, the indexes have weakened in the spring of 2025. The Long Leading Index declined from -2.3 in March to -4.1 in April. The
  • US Economy Slowing but Recession Not Imminent
    Globicus' Leading Economic Indexes are designed to predict economic turning points, and the latest data indicate a somewhat mixed picture. The Long Leading Index turned more negative. The Short Leading Index remained positive and rose to the most positive level since May 2024, and the Total Index has been rose for the third month in four, reinforcing the low likelihood of a near-term recession.
Disclaimer:
This report is of general nature and does not constitute investment or economic advice to any person, or any recommendation to buy or sell any security or to adopt any particular investment strategy. The report is based on our review and analysis of relevant information and statements published by US Federal Reserve, other US or international agencies and institutions, and various other publicly available information and sources deemed reliable. Opinions and forecasts expressed herein are subject to changes without notice.